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One aim of devolution in Scotland was to create a political class more representative of 
the country as a whole.  In practice devolution has accelerated trends towards a 
professional background in Scottish representatives.   There has been a significant 
increase in representativeness by gender; but not by social or occupational background. A 
professional Scottish political class is in the making. Devolution has not had a significant 
effect on the civil service in Scotland.  Mobility between Edinburgh and London and 
between the public and private sectors was always low and Scottish civil servants tended 
to be less likely to gain a private or Oxbridge education.  The Scottish Parliament gains in 
gender representation are not mirrored within the civil service. 
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Introduction 
Devolution in 1999 was widely heralded as an opportunity for a ‘new politics’ in 
Scotland. Power would not only be transferred from London to Edinburgh, but would be 
more widely shared within Scotland. There are several dimensions to the new politics, 
many of which concern the revitalization of civil society and new forms of participation. 
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 Our focus is more narrow, on the political and administrative elites as represented by 
parliamentarians and senior civil servants. As far as politicians are concerned, the aim of 
devolution supporters was to broaden recruitment and create a more open political class 
more representative of the country as a whole. There was a specific commitment to 
gender equity among the parties represented in the Scottish Constitutional Convention 
and a vaguer commitment to representativeness on other dimensions. Devolution 
campaigners did not pay much attention to the civil service, in spite of a general feeling 
that, given the nature of the Scottish Office system, they had too much influence. There 
was, however, a parallel movement to broaden civil service recruitment in the UK as a 
whole, and to bring in outsiders, especially from the private sector, to senior positions. A 
decision was made at the outset to retain a single British civil service in order that 
officials of the Scottish Executive would have the opportunity to move back and forth 
from Whitehall and into European secondments, rather than being confined to 
opportunities in Edinburgh. Our first hypothesis, then, is that devolution has broadened 
the basis of elite recruitment.  
   In Britain and Europe more generally, however, there has been a general trend for 
political recruitment to narrow to the professional middle classes and those occupations 
that lend themselves easily to political life.
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  Politics itself is increasingly a profession, 
with a defined career path and few possibilities for interrupting it or for entering late. 
Recruitment to the senior civil service may be less biased to the privately-educated upper 
classes than in the past, but increasingly dominated by people from middle class 
professional families. Our counter-hypothesis is that devolution, rather than opening up 
politics and administration, has merely provided an opportunity to accelerate these trends, 
producing parallel political and administrative elites that increasingly resemble each other 
but are still distanced from civil society.  
   In both cases, the null hypothesis is that devolution has made no difference to the 
prevailing trends. To test these hypotheses, we need to assess trends over time both in 
Scotland and in the rest of the UK. A Scottish administration had existed since 1885 in 
the form of the Scottish Office and had gradually extended its functions over a hundred 
years. Scottish MPs were somewhat distinct in their backgrounds and, while following 
the UK line on policy matters, had a distinct niche in the Westminster division of labour.
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So we need to identify long-term trends that may be independent of devolution and assess 
the extent to which Scotland was already convergent or divergent from the United 
Kingdom as a whole. Then to assess the impact of devolution, we need to see whether 
there is a break after 1999 and whether Scottish elites are diverging from their UK 
counterparts. In the case of civil servants, such change is liable to be slow and gradual as 
retirees are replaced by new recruits. In the case of politicians, we can track the evolution 
of the Scottish members at Westminster and compare these with the new parliamentarians 
elected to the Scottish Parliament.  
 
Backgrounds of MPs and MSPs 
Since the Second World War, there has been something of a convergence in the 
backgrounds of MPs from the two main British parties, towards the middle class, 
university-educated professional. Labour has lost its working-class element, while the 
Conservative benches have less space for the upper-class, public-school element. By no 
means all the old differences have disappeared, and there is a tendency among the 
professional classes for Labour MPs to be from the public sector and Conservatives from 
the private sector. Another general tendency has been the rise of professional politicians, 
going straight from university into political work, or at least into ‘politics-enabling’ 
professions, those that give the flexible time to devote to politics and hone the 
communicative skills required by politicians.
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   Scotland before devolution seemed less affected by these trends. In the post-war years, 
parliamentary representation from the two main parties in Scotland conformed more 
closely than in England to the class stereotypes.
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 Labour MPs were more likely to be 
working class, trade unionists and former councillors who entered Parliament as the 
culmination of a career in municipal politics. Few of them made it to high office, 
especially outside of their reserved domain of the Scottish Office. Scottish Conservative 
MPs, for their part, were disproportionately upper class, public-school educated and with 
military backgrounds. Indeed this tendency increased during the 1950s and 1960s with 
the decline of urban Toryism.
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 Looking at party representatives in the early 2000s in 
comparison allows us in principle to assess change over time (by comparing MPs now 
and then) and the affects of institutional change (by comparing Scottish and non-Scottish 
MPs with MSPs). In practice, the comparison of Scottish MPs is limited to the Labour 
Party since the Conservatives elected no Scottish MPs in 1997 and only one in 2001 and 
2005.  
    Comparing the backgrounds of politicians over such an extended period of time raises 
a number of technical difficulties. Occupational categories have changed with economic 
change and the growth of the tertiary sector, as government now recognizes with its 
revised classification scheme. So working through the data with the same detailed 
occupational categories would not make much sense or help in resolving our central 
question. We are interested in changes in the broad socio-economic pattern of 
representation, in particular the transformation of class politics. Yet the old class 
divisions are not as clear as in the past. The blue-collar workers often taken as 
synonymous with the working class have declined in number, but the new white-collar 
occupations can by no means be taken as middle-class in the older sense of the word. In 
any case, the standard census categories do not allow us to test our central hypothesis 
about the rise of professionals and the decline of the working class representative. We 
have therefore designed operational categories that allow us to do this. We have grouped 
routine and junior white collar workers with manual workers and distinguished these 
from professionals on the one hand and private business managers on the other. This 
gives us a fairly simple categorization into professionals; private business managers; and 
blue collar and white collar workers.
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 We have also picked out occupations that are 
particularly important for one or other party. 
   There is a large residual category, whose expansion over time is a reflection of the rise 
of new occupations. It also, we would argue, includes a new and important category of 
‘professional politicians’, some of whom have worked all their careers in politics (as 
party workers or politicians’ assistants). Others have worked in ‘politics-facilitating’ 
occupations.  This is difficult to categorise. Politics-facilitating occupations as defined by 
Anthony King include journalists, authors and those in public relations, but also 
barristers, solicitors, lecturers, teachers which are in our professional category.
9
   The 
politics-facilitating occupations in our residual category include journalist, author, PR, 
political worker/ researcher, trade union official, and fulltime members of a quango, 
interest group/ think tank/ lobbyist, or representative of another assembly – but excluding 
lawyers and teachers. 
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  The second problem is that individuals may belong in more than one category, either 
because they have changed occupations of their career, or because for example they may 
be members of professions working in a private business. To deal with this, we have used 
the formative occupation, that is the one in which a politician has spent most of his or her 
pre-parliamentary career.
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 This involves some matters of judgement, especially as many 
Labour politicians in the post-war years were upwardly mobile. Where needed, however, 
we can control for this by looking at both initial occupation and occupation immediately 
before entering politics, if for example we want to know how many people are of 
working-class origin. In fact, this distinction becomes less important over time as fewer 
people have started in working class occupations. 
 
 1. Formative occupation  of Scottish Labour MPs and MSPs, percentage 
 Non-Scottish 
MPs 1945-70 
Scottish MPs 
1945-70 
Non-Scottish 
MPs 2005 
Scottish MPs 
2005 
MSPs 2003 
Professional 40.1 36.1 43.7 46.3 56.0 
Business 10.1 5.2 7.7 4.9 4.0 
Blue-collar and  
white collar 
23.2 42.3 8.4 9.8 2.0 
Other -  
politics 
facilitating
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23.8 15.5 31.8 29.3 32.0 
Other misc 2.8 0.9 8.4 9.8 6.0 
 
    
2. First occupation, Labour MPs and MSPs 
 Non-Scottish MPs 2005 Scottish MPs  2005 MSPs 2003 
Professional 44.4 41.5 54.0 
Business 10.2 7.3 4.0 
Blue collar and white 
collar 
10.5 22.0 10.0 
Other - politics 
facilitating 
25.6 22.0 24.0 
Other misc 9.3 7.3 8.0 
 
Looking at Labour MPs (table 1) we see that they are progressively more professional by 
background, but with Scottish MPs converging with their non-Scottish counterparts. The 
Scottish Parliament, however, marks a decisive shift, as MSPs are more ‘professional’ 
even than non-Scottish Labour MPs. Looking at first occupations rather than formative 
ones, the institutional effect is even more marked (table 2). Scottish MPs are still more 
working class in origin than other Labour MPs, but MSPs are more professional in origin 
than either. We also see an increase in the ‘other’ categories. Many of these are in the 
politics-facilitating occupations, including working for the parties or for MPs and MEPs. 
6% of Labour MSPs had been political workers and another 6% had worked with interest 
groups or think tanks. By contrast, the ‘other politics facilitating’ among the 1945-70 
cohorts was dominated by trade union officials (about 10% in Scotland and the rest of the 
UK). Since most of these would have had working class backgrounds, the generic 
working class presence in that generation was even higher than our figures show. There 
was also in that generation a significant number who had at one time or another been 
insurance salesmen, presumably at that time a politics-facilitating occupation giving 
flexible working hours and ample opportunity to knock on doors. Among the professions, 
teaching has been defined as politics-facilitating by King
13
and Norton
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  and it is indeed 
heavily represented among politicians. The teaching profession has a similar weight 
among Labour MPs and MSPs but the former include more university lecturers and the 
latter more school teachers (a fifth of all Labour MSPs). 
   There has been a trend over the years for Labour MPs to be drawn more from the 
professions and to converge in some respects with the Conservatives.
15
 These findings, 
consistent with other analyses
16
 show that the Scottish Parliament has resulted in a 
marked acceleration in the shift of Labour representation away from traditional working 
class backgrounds to the professional middle classes. There is still evidence of upward 
mobility, comparing first with formative occupations, but the difference between 
Holyrood and Westminster remains.  
 
3. Formative occupation of Scottish Conservative MPs and MSPs, percentage 
 Non-Scottish 
MPs 1945-70  
Scottish MPs 
1945-70 
Non-Scottish 
MPs 2005 
MSPs 2003 
 
Professional 39.9 44.0 36.8 55.6 
Business 41.8 28.0 43.0 16.7 
Blue-collar and 
junior white 
collar 
0.40 0.3 1.0 5.6 
Farmer/ 
landowner 
9.9 18.6 3.6 16.7 
Other - politics 
facilitating 
6.4 2.8 13.0 5.6 
Other misc 1.6 6.3 2.6 0 
 
  On the Conservative side (table 3), we have taken farmers and landowners separately 
from the business category to illustrate the decline of this element in the rest of the UK, 
but the continuation of its significance in Scotland since the 1950s and 1960s. The rise of 
the professions is evident here (as with Labour), as is the decline in the presence of 
business people. The main shift in the professional category is the decline of the military 
officer, who between 1945 and 1970 accounted for 8% of all Conservative MPs and no 
less than a quarter of Scottish Conservatives. There is some evidence of people having 
worked all their lives in politics among the Westminster contingent but not in Scotland. It 
should be said, however, that the number of Conservative MSPs (18) is too small to read 
a lot from the percentages. The 6% of workers in the ranks of Tory MSPs is not a trend 
since it only amounts to one person. On the Conservative side the difference between first 
occupation and formative occupation is less significant, except for a group of people who 
moved into business in the course of their careers and one MSP who moved from 
shipping to a career in farming. As mentioned earlier, we cannot do a statistical analysis 
on the  backgrounds of Scottish Conservative MPs after 1997, but a glance at the figures 
for 1992 (when they returned eleven members, still too few for statistical significance) 
suggests that the professional dominance was already established (without the military 
officers) but that the  farmers had disappeared. Their limited return in the Scottish 
Parliament is therefore interesting.  
   The professional bias also extends to Scottish ministers, over 60% of whom are from 
this background. Among UK ministers, the number of professionals is lower (40%) but 
there is a stronger representation than in Scotland of business, despite the fact the UK 
government was homogeneously Labour while in Scotland Labour shared power with the 
Liberal Democrats. 
   Of course, these trends might just reflect changes in Scottish society as a whole. There 
is some truth in this, but it by no means explains the trends over time or the differences 
between Scotland and England and between Holyrood and Westminster. Scotland’s 
occupational structure has resembled that of England since at least 1921
17
 but the 
convergence in the backgrounds of politicians is recent and particularly marked with the 
arrival of the Scottish Parliament. The proportion of MSPs from a professional 
background is higher than in Scottish society as a whole and the domination of political 
representation by the professional classes has increased faster than among the population 
at large.
18
 The almost complete absence of the lowest occupational category in the 
Scottish Parliament contrasts with its continuing strong presence in Scottish society.
19
   
 
4. Educational background of Labour MPs and MSPs, percentage 
 All Labour 
MPs 1945-70 
Scottish MPs 
1945-70 
Non-Scottish 
MPs 2005 
Scottish MPs 
2005 
MSPs 2003 
Oxbridge 16.2 6.0 20.7 2.5 0 
Other University 30.0 24.0 51.9 55.0 62.0 
Other Higher education   18.5 20.0 28.0 
Independent School 21.5 4.0 20.9 10.0 4.0 
 
Educational backgrounds also show a shift over time and between institutions. Among 
Scottish Labour MPs the proportion with higher educational qualifications increased 
steadily from 1945 to 2005 but lagged consistently behind that of non-Scottish MPs 
(table 4).
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 By 2005, 78% of Scottish Labour MPs and 91% of non-Scottish Labour MPs 
had tertiary qualifications. Among Labour MSPs it was 90%. Nearly all the Scottish 
Labour politicians took their higher education in Scotland, with only two MPs and no 
MSPs educated at Oxbridge, compared with a fifth of non-Scottish Labour MPs. The 
proportion of non-Scottish Labour MPs educated privately has remained at around 20% 
since the war. It was always much smaller among Scottish MPs and only two Labour 
MSPs in 2003 were educated privately. Again, this is not adequately explained by 
differences in the levels of private education in Scotland and England (currently 3.5% 
and 6% respectively). 
 
 5. Educational background of Conservative MPs and MSPs, percentage 
 All Conservative 
MPs 1945-70  
Scottish MPs 
1945-70   
(1970 only) 
Scottish MPs 
1992 
Non-Scottish 
MPs 2005 
MSPs 2003 
Oxbridge 50.0 48.5 (65.2) 27.2 44.8 5.6 
Other University 16.0 15.3  54.5 40.2 61.1  
Other Higher Education   9.1 8.2 11.1 
Independent School 77.0 63.8 (82.6) 54.5 58.0 33.3 
 
   There was also a steady rise in graduates among Scottish Conservative MPs between 
1945 and 1970 (from just over fifty to nearly 80%). The proportion of Oxbridge 
graduates actually increased over these years from 40% to 65%, as did the proportion of 
private school products (from 46% to over 80%).  This was connected with the changing 
fortunes of Scottish Toryism, which historically had its origins in Liberal Unionism of the 
late nineteenth century. The Unionist element was dominant until after the Second World 
War and until 1965 the party was officially called the Scottish Unionist Party, with no 
reference to Conservatism.
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 Decline set in from the late 1950s and the party was pushed 
back to its rural bases dominated by the traditional upper classes. From the 1970s, 
however, the party did seem to become more middle class. Comparison with the Scottish 
Conservative MPs in 1992 (with the usual caveat for the small numbers) suggests that the 
arrival of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 accelerated this longer-term trend. Two thirds 
of Conservative MSPs were educated at state schools, compared with 42% of all 
Conservative MPs elected in 2005. Less than 80% of Conservative MSPs had higher-
level qualifications, lower than non-Scottish Conservative MPs (93%), and only one (6%) 
was educated at Oxbridge compared to 45% of non-Scottish Conservative MPs. 
   The other two major parties in the Scottish Parliament – Scottish National Party (28 
MSPs) and Liberal Democrats (17) – continue this professional trend. No MSP from 
these parties has a blue or routine white collar background. However, neither party shares 
Labour’s public sector dominance of its professional category, while business 
backgrounds are higher in both parties (23% and 18% respectively). There are high levels 
of higher education (93% and 83% respectively).  The Liberal Democrat backgrounds are 
closer to the Conservatives, with three Oxbridge graduates (18%) and 35% from 
independent schools, while the SNP is closer to Labour. Further, the largest Liberal 
Democrat professional category is ‘politics-facilitating’ (35%).   These figures mirror to 
some extent the backgrounds of Liberal Democrat MPs in the UK.  
 
Table 6 Backgrounds of SNP and Liberal Democrat politicians, percentage 
 SNP MSPs 
2003 
LD MSPs 2003 LD Scot MP 
2005 
LD non-
Scottish MP 
2005 
Professional 50.0 29.4 36.4 36.7 
Business 23.1 17.6 18.2 24.5 
Blue-collar and  
white collar 
0 0 0 2.0 
Other -  
politics 
facilitating 
11.5 35.3 27.3 26.5 
Other misc 15.4 17.6 18.2 10.2 
 
 
7. Educational background SNP and Liberal Democrat politicians, percentage 
 SNP MSPs LD MSPs LD Scottish MP 
2005 
LD non-Scottish 
MP 2005 
Oxbridge 0 17.6 9.1 36.7 
Other University 78.6 58.8 72.7 42.9 
Other FE  14.3 5.9 18.2 12.2 
Independent School 10.7 35.3 27.3 44.7 
. 
   The minor parties do little to modify this middle-class professional bias.  All seven 
Green Party MSPs  have a university education and three (43%) were educated privately. 
Three (43%) are drawn from the public sector professions, while four (57%) worked in 
and around the voluntary sector.  This contrasts with the Scottish Socialist Party MSPs 
(six), of which three (50%) have a further or higher education qualification but none were 
taught privately.  However, all of the SSP’s members were drawn from the public sector 
(two) or politics-facilitating (four) professions; indeed they have tended to be upwardly-
mobile people of working class origins taking the same route into politics as previous 
generations of Labour politicians.  
  Scottish Labour parliamentary representation used to be marked by a strong municipal 
element. Between 1945 and 1970, 53% of Scottish Labour MPs had served in local 
government, against 43% of non-Scottish Labour MPs. These were often long-serving 
municipal worthies and even fewer of them than Scottish MPs as a whole made it to 
ministerial office.
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 In recent years, as part of the rise of a professional political class, 
service in local government is increasingly an apprenticeship for Parliament. On the 
Labour side, 64% of non-Scottish MPs have municipal experience, while the figure 
among Scottish MPs has remained rather stable at 54%. Contrary to much casual 
comment, fewer Labour MSPs (44%) have a local government background, partly 
because of an effort by the party not to encourage councillors to take over the new 
institution.  
   Until their reconstitution as the Scottish Conservative Party in 1965, the Scottish Tories 
had rarely contested seats in local government, preferring to back Progressive, Moderate 
or Independent groupings of notables. The post-war years saw an increase in former 
councillors on the Conservative side. The party’s presence in strength was rather short-
lived, as early advances were reversed in the 1980s and 1990s but there is now a cadre of 
Conservative former councillors available for higher office. Among Conservative MPs as 
a whole 30% are former councillors. This is below the proportion at Holyrood (44%) 
although the small numbers again reduce the significance of this difference. 65% of 
Liberal Democrats in Holyrood have local government experience, a figure comparable 
to that of its non-Scottish MPs, evidence of the way in which the party has built itself up 
since the 1990s on it municipal base. Only 29% of the SNP MSPs, however, have come 
from local government (its 6 MPs make statistical analysis meaningless).   
 
 8. Former Councillors 
 Non-Scottish  
MPs 1945-70 
Scottish 
MPs 1945-
70 
Non-Scottish 
MPs 2005 
Scottish 
MPs 2005 
MSPs 2003 
Labour 43.4 53.0 64.0 53.7 44.0 
Conservative 26.2 23.6 32.0 na 22.2 
Liberal Dem na na 65.3 27.3 64.7 
SNP na na na 16.7 28.6 
 
   Another traditional source of recruitment for Labour politicians is the trade union 
movement. We do not have figures for those having held trade union office in the post-
war years, but of non-Scottish Labour MPs elected in 2005 32% were former union office 
holders. Among Scottish Labour MPs the figure was higher at 40%, conforming to the 
generally more traditional background, but among MSPs it fell to 28%.  
 
9. Trade Union officials among Labour MPs and MPS, percentage 
Non-Scottish MPs 2005 Scottish MPs 2005 MSPs 2003 
31.5 43.9 28.0 
 
   Measuring the Scottishness of Scottish politicians is fraught with difficulty, as this is a 
fluid category, with several available criteria and gradations.
23
 There is no evidence of an 
ethnic filter or birth criterion. Just three quarters of all MSPs were born in Scotland and 
two thirds were both born and educated there, well under the proportions for the 
population as a whole. This is consistent with the figures for Scottish MPs. Until the early 
twentieth century,  there had been a substantial number of ‘carpet-baggers’ in Scotland 
but these declined rapidly after the First World War and again in the 1950s.
24
 Of the 15 
MSPs not born or educated in Scotland, most had quite long residence and indeed eight 
had names indicating Scottish ancestry. These might be McCrone’s ‘returning Scots’,25 
with family connections that make it easier to assimilate into Scottish public life.  
   One of the achievements of the Scottish Parliament has been to increase the number of 
women in elected office. 40% of MSPs elected in 2003 were women, just over double the 
proportion at Westminster. This is largely the result of Labour’s policy of gender parity 
in selections for Holyrood, although women accounted for a fifth of Conservative MSPs, 
also more than twice their proportion at Westminster. Gender equality, however, has been 
achieved at the cost of social representativeness, since women MSPs are even more 
professional (64%) in their background than their male counterparts (46%).  
 
10. Women MPs and MSPs, percentage 
 Non-Scottish MPs 2005 Scottish MPs 2005 MSPs 2003 
Labour 28.3 19.5 56.0 
Conservative 8.8 0 22.2 
Liberal Democrat 16.3 9.1 11.8 
SNP na 33 35.7 
 
The arrival of new parties in the Scottish Parliament has made it more politically 
representative, bringing in ideas and political cultures that were for a long time outside 
the political system. It has not, however, made political leadership more socially 
representative, but merely reinforced existing trends towards the professional classes.  
   It is common in devolved or federal systems of government for politicians to move 
from one level to another. This is not simply a matter of progressing from lower to higher 
levels in the way politicians graduate from local government to parliament. There is also 
a flow from the centre or federal level as senior politicians return home to take the 
leadership of the devolved governments. It is striking that in Scotland this phenomenon 
appears to be absent. Fifteen MPs made a one-way choice in 1999 to move to the Scottish 
Parliament, although after 2003 only 10 of them were left. Another eight (six remaining 
in 2003) MSPs had been MPs in the past, all except one from Scottish constituencies.
26
 
Since then no MP or MEP has moved to the Scottish Parliament. Some Conservative 
MSPs have looked to Westminster, where promotion prospects might be better.  One 
MSP (Conservative David Mundell in 2005) was elected to Westminster for a Scottish 
constituency and Ben Wallace left the Scottish Parliament to secure a parliamentary seat 
in England at the same election. The case of Alex Salmond, who resigned from the SNP 
leadership and stayed at Westminster, then changed his mind to resume both the 
leadership and the candidacy for his seat at Holyrood (for 2007), is exceptional. The 
relationship between Westminster and the Scottish Parliament thus shows neither 
centrifugal nor centripetal tendencies in the form of a career train from periphery to 
centre or vice versa, such as have been identified in some other federal and devolved 
systems.
27
  It has its own career structure and apprenticeship paths and provides its own 
leadership cadre.  
   This is partly to do with the rules common to Westminster and Holyrood that ministers 
must be recruited from the ranks of parliamentarians, a rule that does not apply in much 
of Europe. It is also rooted in the traditional career paths of politicians who need to come 
up through the backbenches, unlike in other countries. Most of all, it reflects the 
strategies of the political parties, who have not encouraged the migration of politicians 
among parliaments, although there has been some movement between Westminster and 
the European Parliament. Nor have the parties sought to recruit star candidates outwith 
their own ranks, as happens in Canada as a way to renew the political class. The Liberal 
Democrats and Conservatives did seek to broaden their base in 1999 by inviting non-
members to apply for candidatures (on condition that they joined the party) but none 
seem to have been elected. Despite the encouragement of the First Minister, the Labour 
Party refused to waive its rules to admit the candidature of a prominent Asian 
businessman at a Scottish Parliament by-election in 2005. A few closet party supporters 
had sat in local government as Independents in rural areas where party politics does not 
operate and one of these, Convenor of Highlands Regional Council, reached high office 
in the Executive as a Labour MSP. Apart from this mode, which is not new, there was no 
significant reaching beyond party ranks. Holyrood also resembles Westminster in being a 
career-based parliament. Unlike in other countries, politicians do not come in and out in 
the course of their lives since they know that, outside Parliament, they will be forgotten. 
The influx of novice politicians in 1999, some of whom went straight into Cabinet, thus 
looks like a one-off effect of the new institution rather than a continuing practice.  
 
The Civil Service 
For many years, commentators have criticized the narrow recruitment base of British 
senior civil servants, mostly men drawn from upper middle class families and educated at 
private schools and Oxbridge.
28
  While the Scottish Office was an integral part of the 
British civil service and committed to mobility, there was a tendency for civil servants to 
spend their entire careers there, interrupted sometimes in the case of high flyers by a spell 
in Whitehall (ideally in Treasury or Cabinet Office) to acquire contacts and know-how. 
There was an Oxbridge bias, as in 1968 a fifth of administrative class officials in the 
Scottish Office had degrees from the ancient English universities, but this was much less 
marked than in the case of Whitehall.
29
 Scottish Office officials tended to be native Scots 
who stayed mainly in Scotland. Some fears were expressed at the time of devolution that 
mobility between Edinburgh and London would be restricted and this was a decisive 
argument in the decision to keep a unified civil service. Yet these fears seem to have been 
based on an exaggerated idea of the mobility that had existed before, often more of an 
aspiration and official policy than a reality.  
   Comparing trends over time is difficult since the grading structure of the civil service 
has changed considerably. For example, the old administrative class of senior civil 
servants included new recruits on the fast track as well as higher officials. There is also 
some difficulty in comparing across Whitehall and the Scottish Executive. The latter has 
only one Permanent Secretary, making a statistical comparison meaningless. The heads 
of Scottish departments might be a more meaningful comparison, but they do not enjoy 
the same rank as heads of Whitehall departments (who are Permanent Secretaries). We 
therefore present findings for officials at various levels for comparison. There is in fact a 
fairly clear picture.  
   There does seem a tendency for the proportion of senior Whitehall civil servants 
educated privately to fall. Kavanagh and Richards show the number of Permanent 
Secretaries educated privately fluctuating from 88% from 1974-9, to 93% from 1979-90 
and to 82% from 1990-95.
30
  Our calculations show that it fell to 68% among those in 
office from 1997-2004 and in 2004 it was just 62%.   Further, if we extend the coverage 
to grades 1-3 (paybands 2, 3 and PS) then the figure is 42%.
31
  In Scotland in 2004, 33% 
of the senior management (mostly heads of department) and 21% of heads of group were 
educated privately.  Therefore, if we compare the top civil servants in each arena (see 
table 11) we find significant Scottish differences, with approximately half the proportion 
of Scottish civil servants attending private schools (although the effect is less stark with a 
strict comparison by grade). It is true that England has nearly twice the population of 
privately-educated pupils as Scotland, but this could not be the sole cause of the 
difference, since not all of the Scottish senior civil service was educated in Scotland (see 
below). The significance of private schools in England is not in the number of people 
they educate (which is very small and even smaller for the elite ones) but in their role in 
the formation of elites. Scottish private schools do not appear to do this to anything like 
the same extent.  
 
11. Backgrounds of Permanent Secretaries and Senior Civil Servants in Whitehall  and the Scottish Executive
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 Whitehall Permanent Secretary 
Heads of Department 
Scottish Executive 2004 
 2004 1997-2004 Senior 
Management 
Group 
Heads of Group Other SCS
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 n % n % n % n % n % 
Women 2 13 4 13 1 11 8 20 5 20 
Men 13 87 27 87 8 89 31 80 18 80 
Independent School 8 62 19 68 3 33 7 21 8 35 
State School  5 38 9 32 6 67 27 79 15 65 
Oxbridge 11 73 22 71 3 33 9 26 2 9 
Other University/HE 4 27 9 29 5 56 24 69 21 91 
No University 0 0 0 0 1 11 2 6 0 0 
 
   Scotland has, not surprisingly, always had a smaller proportion of senior civil servants 
educated at Oxbridge than is found in Whitehall. At 14%, the proportion of Oxbridge 
graduates among senior Scottish Executive civil servants is about half than that in 
Whitehall but still significant (table 12). A third of the Scottish heads of department are 
Oxbridge graduates compared with over 70% in Whitehall heads of department (table 11) 
or 48% of Whitehall payband 3 (table 12). Scottish civil servants tend to have been 
educated at Scottish universities (64% of our SCS sample) and there is a smaller 
proportion than in Whitehall (SCS as a whole) who have not been to university at all, 
perhaps reflecting Scotland’s higher graduate population.  
 
12. Senior Civil Service by Higher Education and Payband 2003
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Whitehall 
Departments
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Payband Total 
1 1A 2 3 PS 
No University % 28 23 19 19 11 26 
Other University % 49 53 47 34 41 48 
Oxbridge % 22 23 34 48 48 26 
n 2057 146 541 113 27 2884 
Scottish Executive 
 
No University % 8 8 3 11 0 7 
Other University % 80 87 69 56 100 78 
Oxbridge % 12 5 29 33 0 14 
n 118 38 35 9 1 201 
 
Other measures of ‘Scottishness’ also suggest that most Scottish Executive civil servants 
were born (61%) and/ or schooled (69%) in Scotland.  This is slightly lower (5 of 9, or 
56%) for the senior management group in both measures, while half of the eight 
university graduates took their degrees in Scotland.  Heads of group were slightly more 
likely to have been born (65%), schooled (74%) and taught at a university (65%) in 
Scotland.  
   Mobility still appears to be rather low. Of our SCS sample, 70% had spent no time in a 
Whitehall department. While numbers are too small for statistical significance, the figure 
is higher (78%) in the senior management group but slightly lower (66%) for heads of 
group.  This last figure reflects the fact that a significant number (7, or 20%) of heads of 
group had transferred from Whitehall departments, perhaps in reflection of the greater 
potential for policy-influencing work at a relatively low payband (2 or 3) within the 
senior civil service in the Scottish Executive.   
   While an achievement of the Scottish Parliament has been to increase the number of 
women in elected office, this has not yet been replicated in the civil service.  The number 
of women appointed to Permanent Secretary level in Whitehall was 0% from 1974-9, 
1.1% from 1979 -1990 and 7% from 1990-95.
36
  By 2004 the figure had increased 
significantly (albeit from this low base) to 13% (table 11).  In Scotland the figures are 
similar if we focus on the most senior levels. One person or 11% of the Senior 
Management Group is female, with greater representation in heads of group and other 
SCS (20%).   If we examine the SCS as a whole (table 13), then the picture is mixed.  
While more women are represented in the lowest paybands (1 and 1A, or grades 4 and 5) 
in Scotland, we see higher representation in the more senior UK posts.  Indeed, if we 
examine payband 3 – the equivalent of most of the senior management group – then 
Whitehall has almost double the proportion of women as does the Scottish Executive.  
 
13. Senior Civil Service by Gender and Payband 2003 
Senior Civil Service Gender  Payband Grand Total 
  1 1A 2 3 PS 
Whitehall Departments
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Female n 681 30 148 26 4 889 
% 27 19 25 20 13 26 
Male n 1805 124 444 107 28 2508 
% 73 81 75 80 88 74 
Total  2486 154 592 133 32 3397 
Scottish Executive 
 
Female n 42 9 5 1 0 57 
% 35 20 14 11 0 27 
Male n 79 35 30 8 1 153 
% 65 80 86 89 100 73 
Total  121 44 35 9 1 210 
 
Devolution has not therefore provoked a sharp change in the civil service in Scotland. 
Instead the unified British civil service has shared the same trends.  This even extends to 
external recruitment, although official figures tend to overstate public-private sector 
mobility and detailed figures are difficult to find.  From what we know, external 
appointments are highest in health departments, reflecting the tradition of recruiting chief 
medical, nursing and other positions from the NHS.  In Whitehall, health accounts for 
around 20% of all external appointments and one-third at the payband 3 level.  In the 
Scottish Executive, health accounts for five of ten external appointments.  This includes 
the only appointment within the senior management group, while two of the four 
appointments at payband 2 level came from the NHS (and 2 from local government). 
 
Conclusion 
Devolution has caused a shift in political representation in Scotland but, gender aside, it 
has not widened it. Rather devolution has accelerated the trend towards professional 
middle-class leadership. From lagging behind the UK in this evolution, Scotland has now 
overtaken it. This substantiates our second hypothesis, that there has been a change as a 
result of devolution, but this has not been in a new direction. A distinct Scottish political 
class has emerged, with its own career trajectory separate from the UK one. This is 
perhaps not entirely new, since there was a tendency in the post-war years for Scottish 
MPs to specialize either in Scottish or in UK affairs but there is now an institutional 
boundary which forces the choice. Differences in the social class backgrounds of 
politicians from the main parties have diminished as all have converged on the same 
professional pattern. Perhaps the most significant difference is the greater tendency for 
Labour MSPs to be drawn from the public sector but Conservative, SNP and Liberal 
Democrat MSPs from the private. 
   Patterns among civil servants have changed less dramatically as they are renewed only 
slowly and the Scottish Executive inherited its officials from the Scottish Office. They 
were always drawn less from upper-class backgrounds (as measured by private 
education) than their Whitehall counterparts and the gap has remained as the upper-class 
element has fallen. Here our hypotheses are not substantiated since devolution has not 
made a separate impact. The result is a civil service with a class and educational 
background rather similar to that of the politicians, especially of the ministers in the 
Executive. Civil servants in the past tended to stay in Scotland during their careers and 
devolution does not seem to be making a difference here. The Scottish Executive is 
committed to a similar pattern of civil service reform as is Whitehall, involving more 
recruitment from outside and open competition for posts. This has produced some results 
(notably in health) although outsiders have usually come from other parts of the public 
sector. 
 We do not have systematic data on the social background of leaders of interest groups 
and civic associations in Scotland, but our informed impression is that they are led by 
people of a similar background to the political and administrative elites.
38
 Lindsay 
Paterson has emphasized the continuing role of middle-class civic Scotland after 
devolution, contrasting them with other, demotic forces elsewhere in the society.
39
 This is 
consistent with our findings about elites and the direction in which they are evolving. 
While bureaucratic and political elites are, as elsewhere in the UK, separate, there is an 
interpenetration of party politics and civic Scotland as many MSPs are drawn from the 
ranks of interest groups and voluntary associations, while others come from the public 
sector professions involved in similar activities. The presence of private business and of 
private sector trade unionists, by contrast, is rather low. It would be an error to read off 
political attitudes directly from the backgrounds of politicians, but the presence of public 
sector professionals is also consistent with the greater consensus in Scotland around 
traditional models of public service provision and the lesser enthusiasm for the forms of 
privatization, quasi-privatization and competition found in England. It is also consistent 
with the greater emphasis on consensus and negotiation in public policy-making, in 
consultation with service providers.
40
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